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Abstract 
Voice over IP (VoIP) telephony is becoming widespread in use, and is often integrated into computer networks. Because 
of this, malicious software threatens VoIP systems in the same way that traditional computer systems have been attacked 
by viruses, worms, and other automated agents. VoIP networks are a challenge to secure against such malware as much 
of the network intelligence is focused on the edge devices and access environment. This paper describes the design and 
implementation of a novel VoIP security architecture in which evaluation of, and mitigation against, malicious traffic is 
demonstrated by the use of virtual machines to emulate vulnerable clients and servers through the use of apparent attack 
vectors. This new architecture, which is part of an ongoing research project, establishes interaction between the VoIP 
backend and the end users, thus providing information about ongoing and unknown attacks to users. 
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With the increasing availability of affordable broadband Internet and flatrate plans it is possible to use more applications 
over the Internet by using IP packet-based communication. In particular use of Internet telephony by way of VoIP and 
other multimedia applications have evolved rapidly in recent times. However, such new Internet applications have seen 
parallel developments in the evolution of malware previously not know in analogue telephony. It is therefore important 
that measures and controls are in place to protect both customers as well as the Internet and telephony service providers 
from malicious hackers and financially-driven attackers. Internet security reports show that VoIP will become a more 
interesting target to criminals and malicious hackers. [Center, 2008] states that “Cyber criminals will be drawn to the 
VoIP medium to engage in voice fraud, data theft and other scams — similar to the problems email has experienced”. 
Recent VoIP security surveys show that flooding and DoS (Denial of Service) attacks are the main threats to telephony 
systems [Geneiatakis et al., 2005] [Keromytis, 2010] [McGann et al., 2005]. However, manipulation of sessions such as 
hijacking as well as passive attacks such as eavesdropping can have a significant impact on a person’s privacy or a 
company’s trade secrets.  
 
Traditional security architectures often consist of several firewalls and other security mechanisms to prevent attackers 
from eavesdropping on or penetrating the network. However, TCP/IP packet filtering firewalls have limitations on what 
they can detect and filter. Stateful inspection and some application level firewalls have the ability to detect attacks from 
the outside or information leaks from the inside. For example, [Snort, 2010] in combination with an adaptive firewall is 
one example of an intrusion detection system that can detect and block suspicious patterns in application level network 
data. 
 
Technologies for securing the VoIP connection from one endpoint to the other are often not feasible because a network 
of trust has to be established before the communication takes place. Also, certain parts of SIP (Session Initiation 
Protocol) messages have to remain unencrypted (from an end-to-end perspective, they can always be encrypted between 
single hops) to enable SIP proxies to carry out relying and redirection. A hop-to-hop encryption can be established using 
the SSL/TLS protocol [Rescarlo, 2000]. However, it has been shown that man-in-the-middle attacks can be conducted 
against SSL connections [Soghoian et al., 2010]. 
 
Although the use of conventional security measures such as the use of protocol-independent end-to-end encryption or 
secure protocols such as SRTP (Secure Real Time Protocol) may assist, there are several reasons why such simple and 
obvious solutions often do not work on large scale networks with many users. These include: 
 
 limitations in processing power at end-devices (hardware phones) 
 missing trust model for certificates and keys 
 protocol incompatibility resulting from different protocol implementations 
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This paper proposes a novel security architecture that uses well-known network and computer security methods to detect 
an attack in one part of the VoIP network and thus improve the protection for clients in the entire network. 
 
Section 2 provides an introduction to VoIP technology. Section 3 of this paper discusses attacks and countermeasures and 
related work currently used in VoIP networks. Section 4 describes a novel VoIP security architecture and associated tools 
including the implementation of a VoIP honeypot which is used to retrieve data about the usage and attack rate of VoIP 
systems. Section 5 discusses expected evaluation and results in terms of performance and improvements in security. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
VoIP ARCHITECTURE AND SECURITY 
 
VoIP Architecture 
VoIP is based upon an end-to-end system architecture where the intelligence of the network is focused at the edges, thus 
taking load off the VoIP servers in the core. This has advantages in performance and availability but it can also introduce 
problems, particularly with respect to the security of the system. In such cases the security is potentially decreased by not 
having an intelligent network core. 
 
For example where no end-to-end IP layer encryption is in place then: 
 
b. end systems have no knowledge of malicious rerouting that introduces vulnerabilities such as man-in-the-middle 
attacks 
c. where malware attacks the end-user’s system, this can result in an entire compromise of the VoIP network and 
anti-virus and firewall software might well be rendered useless. This is particularly true for root kit infections 
where a more intelligent network core might provide more security to the network user. 
 
VoIP sessions usually involve several different protocol categories that are all necessary to transport multimedia data 
from one end of the conversation to the other as shown in Figure 1. These include: 
 
vi. low-level utility protocols that are not specific to VoIP, for example ARP, DHCP, or DNS. 
vii. call processing and signaling protocols such as SIP which is used for creating, modifying and terminating 
sessions with one or more participants. These sessions include multimedia telephone calls and conferences. 
viii. media protocols which carry the actual data of the conversation such as audio (voice) and video. The most 
common example is RTP/UDP. 
ix. support protocols for session maintenance. These include RTCP, SDP and NTP 
 
 
Figure 1: VoIP protocol architecture 
 
Security of VoIP Networks and Applications 
 
VoIP packets are routed in the same manner as other IP-based application traffic on the Internet. For malicious hackers it 
is easier to intercept or reroute VoIP packets than to tap a traditional phone line because such an attack can be carried out 
remotely. Because of these security concerns, VoIP traffic should always be encrypted. 
 
Possible attacks and ways to misuse VoIP are [Geneiatakis et al., 2006] [Keromytis, 2010] [McGann et al., 2005]: 
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 Spit (Spam over Internet telephony) 
 Eavesdropping 
 Denial of service (DoS) and flooding 
 Toll fraud 
 Noise injection and malicious traffic 
 
While many approaches to the threat of flooding and DoS attacks have been proposed [Lee et al., 2008], other threats still 
create significant problems for both consumers as well as service providers. Possible attack vectors at different parts of 
the VoIP infrastructure are shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: VoIP attack vectors 
 
VoIP networks present significant security challenges since much of the network intelligence is pushed to the edges of 
the network and thus resides in the end-points, called user agents (UAs). VoIP servers only redirect sessions and assist 
users to find each other. Often, an established VoIP session does not even have to use these servers and end-users can 
communicate directly with each other. SIP provides authentication, integrity, and confidentiality by relying on existing 
security mechanisms such as S/MIME (Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) which provides public-key 
encryption and digital signatures [Ramsdell et al., 2010]. 
 
To authenticate a VoIP user and ensure that the SIP message is generated by a valid UA, a challenge/response dialogue 
is commonly used. An attacker is still able to change parts of the message without any of the UAs involved noticing. The 
only part they cannot simply change is the challenge/response. In order to prevent such attacks, further measures are 
necessary. 
 
Integrity and confidentiality can both be achieved using S/MIME. A user can sign a message with their private key so 
that other users can verify the integrity of the message with the sender’s public key. In a very similar way, a user can 
encrypt a message to other users by using their public keys. It is clear that not all headers of a SIP message can be end-to-
end encrypted since proxy servers on the route from one UA to the other may have to analyse and modify certain parts of 
the SIP header, particularly the first line that contains the address of the next destination. 
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ATTACKS AND CONTERMEASURES 
 
This section describes several techniques used to exploit flaws in the SIP protocol, the VoIP server software, or the UA 
software. Additionally, mitigation techniques against these flaws or the resulting attacks are described. Thus the purpose 
of this section is to provide an overview of what is possible in a SIP-based VoIP environment whether viewed from the 
attacker’s, network administrator’s or security expert’s perspective. 
 
Common VoIP attacks 
 
Recent Internet security and threat reports [Center, 2008] show that the VoIP attack surface is growing. This is both due 
to more people using VoIP services as well as more malicious hackers and criminals focusing on attacking these systems. 
 
The Australian chapter of the Honeynet Project deployed VoIP honeypot sensors (called phoneynet) to look for scans and 
attacks in the Australian address space in 2009 [Reardon, 2009]. Although far less frequent than traditional computer 
virus and DDoS attacks in the same address space, VoIP scans were detected and results were indicative of the 
importance of security countermeasures in this area. 
 
Password authentication 
Circumventing password authentication using dictionary or brute force attacks will always be possible given a large user 
base combined with poor security practice. Thus, authenticating clients and servers before the communication 
commences is not, on its own, a strong method to ensure that only legitimate end-points communicate with each other. It 
can only provide a basic first step toward a secure architecture. 
 
VoIP Phishing (Vishing) 
As with all new technologies it will not take long until criminals discover the potential monetary benefits of social 
engineering attacks as exemplified by e-mail spam. Even though phishing is not an attack on a computer system itself, it 
gives the attacker access to it by using social engineering techniques on legitimate users of the VoIP system. 
 
Denial of Service 
A Denial of Service (DoS) attack renders the target system useless. This can be achieved in a variety of ways, for 
example flooding the VoIP network with SIP messages or changing the registration of VoIP phones on the registrar 
server. The latter can also be used to redirect VoIP traffic to non-legitimate users. 
 
Rogue SIP devices 
[Endler and Collier, 2007] demonstrated several ways to insert a rogue SIP UA or server into a VoIP network. To 




Fuzzing - also known as robustness testing or functional protocol testing [Stallings, 2007]) is a technique used to find 
software and protocol vulnerabilities. Instead of sending predefined input to a service like a SIP server, traffic is 
generated according to rules. For example, the Codenomicon SIP test tool [Codenomicon, 2010] comes with 35,000 test 
cases including INVITE, OPTIONS, and REGISTER SIP messages. 
 
Malicious traffic in the SIP message body 
The SIP protocol specification [Rosenberg et al., 2002] only specifies the content of the SIP message line and the SIP 
headers. The message body on the other hand can contain any arbitrary data. This data can even be encrypted since the 
SIP message body is only used by the end points of a session. Considering the many different VoIP clients and the 
variety of features (like sending an image with an INVITE request), it is quite feasible that software bugs enable a 
malicious hacker to crash the UA or introduce malicious software. 
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VoIP attack countermeasures 
 
Protocol Improvements 
Several protocols exist that are aimed at making VoIP communication secure. The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol 
(SRTP) uses modern encryption standards to provide “confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to 
the RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP” [Baugher et al., 2004]. 
 
Attack Countermeasures 
[Lee and Hunt, 2008].proposed “a novel method to address the protection necessary to mitigate flooding attacks in VoIP 
networks” by extending the SIP authentication method and introducing a firewall nonce checking mechanism  
 
Apart from the VoIP protocol improvements mentioned above, mechanisms that protect the users’ confidentiality can be 
installed in other layers of the network stack. For example IPSec can be used as a basic packet transmission 
infrastructure. 
 
[Thames et al., 2008] outlines a general purpose distributed firewall and response architecture using open-source 
software. It is a fundamental principle that “once a source IP address has been classified with an anomaly detection 
mechanism as being untrustworthy, [the architecture has to] deny all access to or from the anomalous host for all 
members of the trusted domain of administration.” We follow this principle and apply it to the special case of a VoIP 
network. 
 
[Rieck et al., 2008] describes a self-learning intrusion detection system for VoIP systems that can detect SIP traffic such 
as session setups and tear down messages that deviate from the normal. Another approach to detect whether a stream of 
data contains telephone voice has been suggested by [Zissman, 1996]. Also, rules to detect some SIP attacks have been 
published for open-source intrusion detection software such as Snort [Gauci, 2008]. 
 
DESIGN OF THE PROPOSED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
 
The goal of the VoIP security architecture12 is to make each user more secure even if attacks and virus infections are in 
progress. The main idea behind this architecture is collaboration, i.e. servers and clients communicating with each other 
to increase detection rates of malicious activities. On the end-user side of communication this collaboration can be active 
or passive. An active collaboration involves specific software that the end-user has to run close to their VoIP equipment 
in order to collect additional information about malicious activities that the service provider cannot see from their 
position. In a passive collaboration the user does not have to change the VoIP and network setup and configuration. As 
shown in Figure 3, reports from end-users are collected in the core of the VoIP network. Then, event correlation provides 
data for countermeasures that can happen in the core or be pushed back to the users. The Session Border Controller 
(SBC) is a VoIP application firewall that is installed on the perimeter of the VoIP network. It can be used to deliver 
additional security features to network users. 
 
Compared to other general purpose architectures that focus mainly on computer systems and attack vectors such as 
websites or email attachments, our VoIP security architecture examines the use of specific characteristics of VoIP traffic 
such as SIP and RTP packets. Also, the IDSs and event correlation rules have to be specifically tailored to recognise 
specific threats as well as the general classes of attacks discussed in Section 2.2. 
 
Active collaboration security software is deployed at the end-user to improve security related communication with the 
service provider. For example, an IDS is installed at the user’s residential gateway to collect accurate information about 
malicious packets directed at the user or leaving the user’s broadband connection. 
 
While all of the inputs from the end-user side shown in Figure 3 can be generated automatically, cases exist where users 
need to be able to report suspicious activities and VoIP anomalies to the service provider. However, it is crucial that users 
are not able to alter the VoIP network’s behaviour by introducing malicious data. 
 
                                                          
12 This architecture is part of an ongoing research project of the Internet Security Research Group at the University of 
Canterbury, New Zealand. 
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Figure 3: Proposed security architecture 
 
A reporting option for VoIP users can be as simple as pressing a certain number pad key or combination of keys to 
indicate an incoming malicious call they want to be automatically blocked on the provider side in the future. As soon as 
enough reports from different users about one particular kind of call are transmitted to the provider, an anomaly 
detection/event correlation engine can be used to decide whether the VoIP network is in need of protection from this 
attack. By deploying a host-based private firewall or proxy at the end-user side of the VoIP communication, information 
about the state of the network and ongoing or previous attacks can be sent back to the service provider. This information 
can then be used to inform other customers and to improve the security of the system, for example by adding new rules to 
a firewall. 
 
An effective way to inform users of attacks and vulnerabilities is to use the same communication channel as the threat 
itself. The reason for this is that no additional form of communication has to be established which can save costs and 
makes deployment of VoIP much simpler, particularly where many UAs are implemented. SIP can be extended with 
instant messaging capabilities using the MESSAGE method [Campbell et al., 2002]. On the other hand, a DoS or 
flooding attack will not only render the VoIP service useless; it can also potentially block the user notification channel. 
  
The key events that are collected by the customer-side IDS in VoIP networks and that are correlated at the service 
provider side are: 
 
 simultaneous SIP scans against a certain number of users 
 brute-force attacks against SIP authentication of several users 
 connections from blacklisted IPs/domains 
 known malformed packets (Snort rules) 
 crashes of UAs or residential gateways and 
 other patterns that can be compared to results from the honeypot. 
 
An event correlation engine such as the open-source software SEC can take several of these events and put them in a 
temporal context [SEC, 2010]. If a certain number of events during a predefined time interval occur, an alarm or a 
reacting action is triggered as shown in Figure 4. 
 
The following list gives examples of actions taken after certain events affecting several users have been detected. The 
variable x denotes the number of end-users on the network. This can be changed to adjust the algorithms to the specific 
network. 
 
1. More than x end-users report a malicious traffic event from the same origin: add origin to blacklist and notify all 
users. 
2. More than x end-users report a crash of their phone’s software: add signature to IDS of all users. 
3. End-user reports connection attempt from blacklisted IP: “upvote” IP on central blacklist. 
4. End-user reports blacklisted malicious data signature: “upvote” signature on central blacklist. 
5. More than x end-users manually report a SIP session (a conversation) as spam or malicious: add origin or 
extracted signature to blacklist and notify all users. 
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Figure 4: Two event correlation examples 
 
Distribution of new rules and blacklists has to happen in a secure and authenticated way. One way to establish a secure 
channel from one host to another is the protocol Secure Shell (SSH). OpenSSH is a collection of open-source tools that 
conduct encrypted and authenticated file transfer. 
 
EXPECTED EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
In order to determine the usefulness and effectiveness of our implementation of the new architecture, measurements of 
the security improvements have to be taken in a statistically sound manner. The variables that are being observed and 
measured are called response variables. The qualitative and quantitative measurements we are going to undertake in the 
experiments that are part of the ongoing research are described in the following paragraphs. 
 
The propagation time of a worm using a zero-day exploit as well as the percentage of infected systems are good metrics 
for the effectiveness of the defensive systems and health of a large network. Other useful metrics include the subjective 
perceived security of each user and the number of malicious connections and data from end-users back to the service 
provider where it can be measured in a centralised way. Sudden changes in user behaviour [Wang, 2009]) could indicate 
newly infected VoIP software as regular VoIP data tends to be relatively predictable compared to general network traffic. 
 
Many existing programs and security mechanisms have proven to be suitable for improving network security in VoIP 
environments. In particular, open-source software is very flexible when it comes to supporting new protocols or 
implementing new communication paths between several different programs. Snort is able to detect all known attacks as 
soon as signatures are available. Statistically, it is more likely that another user falls victim to a zero-day exploit in a 
large network first. As soon as the victim of the attack triggers the distribution of new Snort signature files, all the other 
users on the network will be safe from this particular attack. SEC has proven to be a solution that is easy to deploy in 
small networks. However, large enterprise networks often demand additional features such as load-balancing. SEC does 
not provide these features out-of-the-box but it is feasible to adept it to the requirements of the specific environment. 
 
In order to obtain statistics on the amount of VoIP traffic, both legitimate and malicious, a VoIP module for the low-
interaction honeypot Dionaea [Koetter, 2010] has been developed. The intention behind Dionaea is to trap malware 
exploiting vulnerabilities exposed by services offered to a network, the ultimate goal being to retrieve a copy of the 
malware. 
 
The VoIP module for Dionaea exposes a SIP server (by default on port 5060) to the network. The module is written in 
the scripting language Python in order to achieve flexibility and quick development cycles. Dionaea offers a variety of 
ways to log the actions taken by an attacker: traditional text file logs, logging to an SQLite database which allows 
flexible and easy querying, and logging to a remote XMPP server. The latter is also used to exchange information and 
downloaded malware with other honeypots. 
 
The exposed SIP server responds to REGISTER and OPTIONS requests and is able to establish multimedia sessions in 
response to INVITE requests. Since sophisticated and targeted attacks on VoIP users are not very common yet, the main 
goal of Dionaea’s VoIP module is to analyse the activity of scans and DoS attacks on large networks such as the Internet.  
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VoIP communication is an important aspect of many people’s and businesses’ daily lives and routines. We have 
described some of the research being carried out on VoIP networks as well as associated Internet threats. Further, we 
have shown that the amount and quality of attacks against telephony systems is increasing. 
 
We have described the concept of a novel VoIP-specific security architecture. In order to obtain a maximum gain in 
security while maintaining good performance results, we looked at several methods to implement end-user VoIP IDS and 
centralised event-correlation engines. Furthermore, we have shown that a combination of end-user (distributed) and 
centralised systems can achieve better results than stand-alone systems. Due to its use of open-source software, the 
architecture allows for individual customisation and quick changes. 
 
We still have to test our architecture against VoIP data obtained from real world networks to demonstrate the 
improvement in security and performance. Also, the results are still preliminary and subject to more measurements and 
evaluation based on a stronger statistical foundation. 
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